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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In its Brief and Supplemental Brief, FNMA throws out numerous red herrings and 
issues improperly raised by FNMA for the first time on appeal in an apparent attempt to 
divert the Court from the actual issues properly before it. 
At issue below and here on interlocutory appeal is the validity of the Order of 
Restitution permanently evicting Ms. Sundquist from her home, issued by the trial court 
as a result of FNMA's request for the Order of Restitution at an "immediate occupancy 
hearing" held pursuant to UCA § 78B-6-810(2). 
At the Immediate Occupancy Hearing, Ms. Sundquist directly challenged 
FNMA's standing to bring this unlawful detainer action seeking the Order of Restitution, 
(a statutory remedy only provided for in the unlawful detainer statute), asserting that 
FNMA does not own her home, and therefore lacks any right to possession or occupancy 
of her home so as to allow it to evict her through this unlawful detainer action.1 
FNMA claimed below and on appeal that it has standing based on a Trustee's 
Deed it received from ReconTrust, which Trustee's Deed, FNMA claims, conveyed title 
to Ms. Sundquist's home to FNMA. 
FNMA erroneously asserts that standing is being raised for the first time on appeal even though 
Sundquist expressly stated in her trial brief that FNMA lacked standing: 
Therefore, the foreclosure by ReconTrust Company N.A., violated Utah statues and is 
void. Since it is void, the Trustee has no authority to issue a Trustee's deed to Federal 
National Mortgage Association (FNMA), the Plaintiff to this action. Hence FNMA has 
no standing or basis upon which it can evict Sundquist. 
See Eviction Hearing Brief of Defendant/Appellant, pg 39. Addendum, Doc. 2. 
In any event, questions concerning FNMA's standing to bring an unlawful detainer action 
and evict Ms. Sundquist may be raised at any time since they question the court's subject matter 
jurisdiction, even for the first time on appeal. Harris v. Springville City, 712 p.2d 188, 190 
(Utah 1986). See also Utah R.Civ.P. 12(h)(2). 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Ms. Sundquist argued below and here on appeal that FNMA could not have 
acquired title to the property from ReconTrust because ReconTrust has never been 
granted the statutory authority by the Utah Legislature to conduct a non-judicial 
foreclosure sale or convey a trustee's deed. Therefore, any purported foreclosure sale 
conducted by ReconTrust, and the purported Trustee's Deed to FNMA, are ultra vires 
and consequently null and void ab initio. In other words, as a matter of law, whatever 
ReconTrust has done, it has not affected Ms. Sundquist's title to her home. 
FNMA countered below, and now on appeal, that Federal law, specifically the 
National Banking Act, preempts Utah law such that the Utah Legislature lacks the 
authority to regulate ReconTrust's non-judicial foreclosure activities in Utah because, 
FNMA claims, it is acting in a "fiduciary capacity" when it conducts foreclosures in 
Utah. 
FNMA's federal preemption argument totally fails, however, because it was not 
acting in a "fiduciary capacity" when it purportedly foreclosed on Ms. Sundquist's home. 
Both Utah and Texas law make clear that a foreclosing "trustee" is not the same as a 
fiduciary "trustee" which acts in a "fiduciary capacity" since there is no fiduciary 
obligation from a foreclosing trustee to either the beneficiary or the trustor under a trust 
deed. 
Since, FNMA's preemption argument fails in its entirety," the Court must look 
simply to the Utah statutory language which it is admitted does not grant to ReconTrust 
2
 In the alternative, the preemption arguments also fail because 1) ReconTrust's actions were 
contrary to Utah law, 2) local banks are not allowed to act as foreclosing trustees in Utah, and 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
any statutory authority to exercise the statutory power of sale or convey a trustee's deed. 
Consequently, ReconTrust's Trustee's Deed is null and void, and FNMA lacks title, 
which means it lacks standing. And therefore the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
to entertain an eviction action brought by FNMA, and lacks any jurisdiction to evict Ms. 
Sundquist through the Order of Restitution being appealed. 
The Court therefore only has jurisdiction to declare Ms. Sundquist the prevailing 
party and remand the case so that she may be awarded her attorney fees and the unlawful 
detainer action be dismissed. 
Attorney Fees 
Finally, if Ms. Sundquist prevails on this appeal in challenging the legal effect of 
ReconTrust's trustee's deed, she necessarily proves that FNMA lacks standing, and she 
will have thereby prevailed on the entire case in chief and is entitled to her fees as the 
prevailing party. She is also entitled to an award of fees under the private attorney 
general doctrine, even though the Legislature has unconstitutionally attempted to prohibit 
• the Court from allowing and awarding such fees. 
Improperly Raised Issues 
FNMA raises several issues for the first time in its appellate briefs that were not 
raised by FNMA below and therefore cannot be raised or properly considered by the 
Court on appeal. Ms. Sundquist will therefore not address them here, but will move that 
therefore do not acquire any competitive advantage over national banks from the statute, and 3) 
the statutes at issue are not regulations of ReconTrust's activities as a national bank, but rather an 
affirmative grant of statutory authority to those groups identified. 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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they be stricken, or in the alternative that she be allowed additional briefing on such 
issues if the Court is going to consider them. They are briefly outlined here.3 
1) FNMA asserts for the first time on appeal that the Order of Restitution 
was only a "temporary eviction" 
FNMA attempts to introduce on appeal an entirely new concept to Utah law -
"temporary evictions." Not only is there no legal basis for the trial court to "temporarily" 
evict Ms. Sundquist, there is no record that the trial court in fact only "temporarily" 
evicted her since the Court made no such statement and since the Order of Restitution 
permanently evicted her. Furthermore, the trial court could not have granted a 
"temporary eviction" while retaining the question of standing and subject matter 
jurisdiction for future determination since once its subject matter jurisdiction has been 
challenged, it must be decided before anything else may be done by the Court in the 
case.4 
FNMA further improperly argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court 
was balancing the respective merits of the parties' claims to temporary possession in 
3
 This "no defense available" argument and the" waiver" argument are also being raised for the 
first time in Appellee's Supplemental Brief when there is no justification for raising them there 
for the first time since they do not address issues that could not have been raised to the Court of 
Appeals. Which provides another ground for striking said arguments. 
4
 It is well-settled that subject matter jurisdiction must be decided before the court can resume 
the case and take any other action, such as a "temporary eviction" since if it lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction over a claim it only retains the authority to dismiss the claim. "Because it is a 
threshold issue, we address jurisdictional questions before resolving other claims." Housing 
Authority of the County of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 44 P.3d 724,1J11 (Utah 2002). "Without subject 
matter jurisdiction a court cannot proceed. See Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275, 1276 n.3 
(UtahApp. 1990)." Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate, 851 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 
1993). "When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss 
the action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989)(citing 
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987)). 
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order to determine to whom it would award "temporary possession" even though there 
was no discussion of this below and there is no law that allows the Court to do so. 
2) FNMA argues for the first time on appeal that there is a "presumption 
of validity5' of the foreclosure sale 
In spite of ReconTrust's clear lack of statutory authority to conduct a non-judicial 
foreclosure sale in Utah, FNMA urges this Court for the first time on appeal to simply 
look the other way by summarily "presuming" the foreclosure sale was valid. There is no 
such "presumption of validity" that allows the Court to simply assume in an unlawful 
detainer action that a foreclosing trustee had authority to conduct a foreclosure sale, 
especially when the Legislature has explicitly confirmed that unqualified trustee's lack 
any statutory authority. 
3) FNMA argues for the first time on appeal that a defendant in an 
unlawful detainer action based on UCA 78B-6-802.5 cannot assert any affirmative 
defenses. 
FNMA asserts for the first time on appeal that Sundquist cannot challenge the validity 
of the foreclosure sale in defense against the unlawful detainer action. Such an argument 
lacks any legal support, is contrary to the fundamental right of a defendant to demand that 
the plaintiff prove each element of its prima facie case (including ownership of the 
property), and is contrary to the Unlawful Detainer Action itself which expressly 
provides in Subsection 78B-6-809.2 that an unlawful detainer proceeding is "barred" if a 
defendant asserts that it's interest in the property is "not ended or determined." By 
challenging the legal effectiveness of ReconTrust's foreclosure sale and Trustee's Deed, 
Ms. Sundquist has asserted that her interest in the property is not ended (or determined) 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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yet, and therefore the unlawful detainer action is "barred," as expressly allowed by the 
Legislature in the act, contrary to FNMA's novel argument. 
4) FNMA asserts for the first time on appeal that Ms. Sundquist has 
"waived" any objection to the validity of the non-judicial foreclosure sale 
FNMA asserts for the first time on appeal that Sundquist waived any right to 
challenge the unlawful non-judicial foreclosure simply by not bringing a judicial action to 
challenge it in advance. There is no legal support for such a position and it would 
effectively amount to legislating from the bench if the Court were to create a requirement 
that a party wishing to challenge a non-judicial foreclosure must bring suit or forever lose 
his or her statutory rights under the non-judicial foreclosure statutes. Furthermore, the 
case law relied upon by FNMA states that there is an exception to any possibility of 
waiver if the non-compliance being asserted results in a "nullity", as is the case here. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The challenge to the validity of the Order of Restitution due to 
ReconTrust's lack of statutory authority to convey title to FNMA is ripe 
for determination on appeal 
Without any factual or legal support, FNMA argues that ReconTrust's statutory 
authority to exercise the power of sale is not ripe for this Court to decide. The record 
does not support this position. 
Procedurally, it is undisputed that FNMA sought an Order of Restitution through a 
Subsection 810(2) hearing. Ms. Sundquist asserted at the hearing that as a matter of law 
FNMA did not have the "right of occupancy" necessary to evict her due to ReconTrust's 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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lack of statutory authority to exercise the power of sale and convey a valid Trustee's 
Deed to FNMA. 
FNMA's own counsel acknowledged at the hearing that "[t]he only issue here 
seems to be ReconTrust's authority to foreclose," and then proceeded to argue that the 
National Banking Actpreempted any restriction on ReconTrust's authority to conduct 
non-judicial foreclosure sales in Utah. 
While there are other issues yet to be decided5, the legal issue of ReconTrust's 
lack of statutory authority was directly before the trial court, which necessarily ruled 
against Ms. Sundquist by granting the Order of Restitution being appealed. Having been 
raised and decided below in FNMA's favor, the issue of ReconTrust's statutory authority 
is ripe for this Court to decide. 
Since FNMA opened Pandora's box, it cannot now complain about what comes 
out. 
II. FNMA lacks standing because the "Trustee's Deed" from ReconTrust is 
null and void ab initio 
* For example, in this case, FNMA was not the purported owner/beneficiary of the loan secured 
by Ms. Sundquist's house at the time it was "sold" by ReconTrust. The Mortgage Electronic 
Registration System Inc. supposedly had assigned all beneficial interest in the trust deed to BAC 
Home Loans Servicing, LP, on January 7, 2011. FNMA therefore purportedly had no interest in 
the property at the time of the sale because it was not purportedly assigned any interest in the 
trust deed until May 18, 2011 - the day after it was foreclosed on May 17, 2011 - by means of 
an assignment from BAC. Nevertheless, the trustee's deed issued by ReconTrust affirmatively 
and falsely asserts that FNMA was the highest bidder at the sale on May 17th. But at that time, 
BAC not FNMA was supposedly the "beneficiary" of the Trust Deed, and therefore supposedly 
the only party that could make a credit bid. See UCA 57-1 -28(b). Consequently, it appears that 
either FNMA's purchase of the property was invalid because it was not in fact the highest bidder 
at the purported sale since it was not the true beneficiary owner of the debt on that day, or if it 
was the true beneficiary/owner of the debt, the foreclosure was invalid because FNMA did not 
execute and acknowledge the substitution of trustee as explicitly required by the Legislature in 
Section 57-l-22(2)(d). 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Since this is an unlawful detainer action, FNMA as the plaintiff obviously has the 
prima facie burden of proving that it has a titled right to the property that supersedes and 
defeats Ms. Sundquist's rights as the fee title owner. FNMA has asserted that it acquired 
superior title from ReconTrust through its Trustee's Deed. 
But if ReconTrust lacked the statutory authority to conduct the foreclosure sale, it 
also lacked the statutory authority to grant the Trustee's Deed to FNMA. Absent a valid 
Trustee's Deed, FNMA does not own the home and lacks any right or standing to bring 
this action, and the trial court necessarily lacks any subject matter jurisdiction to entertain 
this action, let alone issue the Order of Restitution permanently evicting Ms. Sundquist. 
A. FNMA lacks standing to bring this unlawful detainer action and be issued the 
Order of Restitution if there was not a valid foreclosure 
FNMA mistakenly asserts that under Section 78B-6-802.5 a person "who has 
defaulted under her note and thus has been subject to foreclosure commits unlawful 
detainer." Appellee's Supplemental brief, pg 2 (emphasis added). 
But merely being "subject to foreclosure" is not the statutory test. There must be 
an actual "disposition" of the property by a valid foreclosure sale creating a "previous 
owner:" 
Unlawful detainer after foreclosure or forced sale. 
A previous owner, trustor, or mortgagor of a property is guilty of unlawful 
detainer if the person: 
(1) defaulted on his or her obligations resulting in disposition of the property by a 
trustee's sale or sheriffs sale; and 
(2) continues to occupy the property after the trustee's sale or sheriffs sale after 
being served with a notice to quit by the purchaser. 
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It would certainly be a bizarre interpretation of the statute to conclude that the 
Legislature intended that parties be evicted based on unlawful foreclosures. The express 
statutory requirement of a "previous owner" and an actual "disposition," or transfer, of 
the property clearly imply the necessity of a valid foreclosure, since an invalid 
foreclosure by one without statutory authority could not result in the "disposition" of the 
property, or create a "previous owner." 
Section 802.5 should therefore be interpreted as requiring FNMA to affirmatively 
prove it has acquired valid title by proving there was a valid foreclosure sale. This is 
cannot do when ReconTrust delivered it a null and void Trustee's Deed. 
B. ReconTrust's lack of statutory authority renders its actions null and void 
It is undisputed that ReconTrust is not qualified under Section 57-1-21. 
ReconTrust therefore lacks any statutory authority to exercise the power of sale provided 
in UCA 57-1-23 which specifically provides: "The trustee who is qualified under 
Subsection 57-l-21(a)(i) or (iv) is given the power of sale by which the trustee may 
exercise and cause the trust property to be sold. 
This admitted lack of statutory authority should resolve this case. FNMA, 
however, wants this Court to ignore such fundamental jurisdictional questions by 
summarily "presuming" the Trustee's Deed to be valid simply because ReconTrust went 
through the motions of a foreclosure sale, albeit unlawfully, while Ms. Sundquist was in 
default. 
"Disposition" is a term of art in the real estate/legal setting and means: "transferring to the care 
or possession of another. The parting with, alienation of, or giving up of property." Black's 
Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. (1991). 
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But even debtors in default have statutory and contractual rights - rights which 
are not even triggered unless and until they are in default - - that this Court cannot 
summarily ignore simply because Ms. Sundquist's was in default, otherwise all rights and 
protections for people in default would be automatically eliminated. 
As this Court has previously unequivocally stated in the Singer Manufacturing Co. 
case, 2 Utah 542, 546-47 (Utah Terr. 1880): 
The deed of trust authorized the sale to be made by the United States 
Marshall. This was not done. ... The fact that no injury or fraud in the sale has 
been shown does not affect the question. Nor is it affected by the fact that the 
purchaser was an innocent party. The sale was made by one not authorized to 
make it and it cannot be upheld. It is simply void, and no one gains any rights 
under it. 
As this Court indicated, the lack of any injury does not matter. The sale is void. 
See also Concepts, Inc. at 1160 and 1161. (Strict compliance is required because the 
trustor is "absolutely" entitled to have his property foreclosed "by the person appointed 
by him"). 
FNMA attempts to distinguish Singer Manufacturing from this case by asserting 
that there is no similar contractual restriction on who may perform the foreclosure sale in 
the Trust Deed at issue. FNMA is wrong. By contractual agreement contained in the 
Trust Deed, Ms. Sundquist and the Original Lender agreed that possession of her home 
can only be terminated by a valid foreclosure conducted in accordance with the Deed of 
Trust and the statutory foreclosure provisions. See Trust Deed [^16 (trust deed could only 
be foreclosed in accordance with "Applicable Law") and ^ 24 (successor trustee can only 
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succeed to the title, power and duties conferred upon the Trustee therein and by 
Applicable Law). Addendum II, Doc. 10.7 
Consequently, just as in Singer Manufacturing, any action by ReconTrust that is 
not performed in compliance with the "Applicable Law" of Utah, such as exercising the 
power of foreclosure, is void, and no person can obtain any rights therefrom. 
FNMA next mistakenly relies on Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37,124 189 P.3d 51, 
for the proposition that an unauthorized sale by a fiduciary trustee of an express trust is 
not void unless it harms the public. But as discussed below, ReconTrust is not a fiduciary 
trustee of an express trust, and therefore Ockey does not save it. A fiduciary trustee of an 
express trust actually has legal title that it can convey, even if it does so in violation of its 
fiduciary duties. That is why an improper grant of title by a fiduciary trustee is only 
voidable and not inherently void (unless it is contrary to public interest, which a 
legislatively declared "unauthorized" trustee's deed obviously would be). 
But an unqualified foreclosing trustee, on the other hand, never succeeds to the 
statutorily created trustee's duties rights and title, and therefore never acquires any 
trustee's title to convey. Consequently, any purported transfer of title by an unqualified 
trustee is empty - it is void. 
FNMA then argues that the fact the Legislature imposed civil liability on 
"unauthorized persons" who conduct unauthorized foreclosure sales, without expressly 
While not part of this interlocutory appeal, it should also be noted that the original "Lender" 
expressly reserved for itself the right to appoint successor trustees. See ^ | 24 of the Trust Deed. 
The Lender, defined in the Trust Deed as "America's Wholesale Lender," did not appoint 
ReconTrust to be a successor trustee. Therefore there is a dispute as to whether ReconTrust was 
properly appointed as a successor trustee if this case continues, contrary to FNMA's assertions. 
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stating that a trustee's deed issued by such "unauthorized persons" is null and void, 
means that the unauthorized trustee's deed is somehow magically lawful. The 
Legislature does not need to state the existing common law as part of the statute in order 
for the common law to still have effect. It's axiomatic that a party who does not have 
title cannot convey title - and any attempt to do so is simply void. 
Under FNMA's theory, absolutely anyone could conduct non-judicial foreclosure 
sales and enforce them without being challenged - dentists, irate neighbors, scam artists, 
ex-spouses, mothers-in-law, disgruntled employees, stalkers, etc. Anybody! And the 
courts could do absolutely nothing about it. Such a free-for-all would result in total 
chaos, and certainly is not what the Legislature intended simply because it did not bother 
to state the obvious when creating new statutory civil liability for "unauthorized 
persons". 
ReconTrust's lack of statutory authority precludes it from conveying title. Its 
Trustee's Deed is therefore null and void, ab inito, and FNMA consequently lacks 
ownership and standing to bring this unlawful detainer action. 
III. Federal law does not preempt the Legislature's policy decision as to whom 
it will grant the statutory authority to conduct statutory foreclosure sales 
in Utah 
FNMA dismisses ReconTrust's lack of any statutory authority as inconsequential 
because it erroneously argues that the Utah non-judicial foreclosure statutes are 
preempted by federal law. FNMA's preemption arguments are flawed in numerous 
respects. 
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A. FNMA's preemption theory mistakenly asserts that there are regulations in 
Utah that are preempted, when there are no regulations at issue, only an 
affirmative grant of statutory authority that simply does not include 
ReconTrust along with millions of other persons and entities 
FNMA asserts that ReconTrust has authority to conduct a trustee's sale in Utah 
because "the Utah Code provisions that purport to prohibit ReconTrust from acting as 
a foreclosure trustee are preempted by the National Banking Act (NBA) as interpreted by 
the regulations found in 12 C.F.R. § 9.7." Appellee's Brief pg 22. 
But there are no regulations or provisions "purporting to prohibit" ReconTrust 
from acting as a foreclosing trustee - there simply is not a statute affirmatively granting 
it any authority to act as a foreclosing trustee. Just as there is no statute granting such 
authority to state banks, medical professional corporations, landscapers, newspaper boys, 
architects, hairstylists, firefighters, auto repair LLC's, investment firms, and so on. 
ReconTrust therefore, is not being regulated, it simply was not selected to be given 
the statutory authority necessary to perform the statutory remedy of a non-judicial 
foreclosure sale. 
FNMA then argues "to the extent that Utah law imposes additional requirements 
on ReconTrust, it is preempted by the NBA and the OCC's regulations interpreting the 
statute, 12 C.F.R. § 9.7." Id. pg 23. But once again there are no additional regulations or 
requirements placed on ReconTrust to be a foreclosing trustee in Utah. Again, 
ReconTrust simply is not in the class that has been affirmatively granted authority. 
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FNMA has not presented any "preemption" law that states that federal law 
mandates that the legislature affirmatively grant to ReconTrust the statutory power to 
foreclose, just because it wants it. 
B. FNMA's preemption theory is fundamentally flawed since it is based on 
ReconTrust acting in a "fiduciary capacity" when it forecloses, when in fact it 
does not act in a fiduciary capacity when it forecloses 
In addition to the preliminary mistake of assuming that there are regulations to be 
preempted, FNMA's entire theory is based on the irrelevant claim that "Section 92a(a) of 
the NBA gives the OCC the authority to grant national banks like ReconTrust, the federal 
right to act as trustee, executor, administrator ... or in any other fiduciary capacity in 
which State banks, trust companies, or other corporation which come into competition 
with national banks are permitted to act..." 
Even if the OCC has such authority, that power does not matter here because one 
does not act in a "fiduciary capacity" when one acts as a foreclosing trustee. 
FNMA's entire preemption argument fails to address the most fundamental 
prerequisite question: Does ReconTrust act in a "fiduciary capacity" when it acts as a 
foreclosing trustee in Utah? It does not. 
1. A foreclosing trustee in Utah does not act in a "fiduciary capacity" 
Utah appellate courts have steadfastly held that there is no fiduciary duty created 
by "the mere utilization of [a] trust deed in the loan transaction." Blodgett v. Martsch, 
590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978). See also First Security Bank of Utah v. Banbeny 
Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1256 (Utah 1989); Russell v. Lundberg, 2005 UT App 315, f 
20, If 21 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (the "trustor-trustee relationship, standing alone, is not the 
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kind of special relationship that gives rise to a fiduciary duty."); Five F, LLC v. Heritage 
Savings Bank, 2003 UT App 373 f^ 20 (holding that plaintiff had not presented evidence 
of a relationship that would create an actionable fiduciary duty from trustee to plaintiff). 
As observed by this Court in Banberry Development: "A fiduciary is a person with 
a duty to act primarily for the benefit of another." 786 P.2d 1326, 1333. And as this 
Court noted in Blodgett v. Martsch, "the only entity to which the trustee feels [any] 
fiduciary obligation is itself." 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978). 
When one contemplates a "trustee" acting in a "fiduciary capacity," one envisions 
a trustee appointed to manage an express fiduciary trust. What constitutes a fiduciary 
trust in Utah is well summarized in Davis v. Young, 2008 UT App 246 ^ 18: 
"A trust is a form of ownership in which the legal title to property is vested in a 
trustee, who has equitable duties to hold and manage it for the benefit of 
beneficiaries." In connection with those duties, "the trustee has exclusive control 
of the trust property, subject ...to the limitations imposed by law [and] the trust 
instrument, and 'once the settler has created the trust he is no longer the owner of 
the trust property and has only such ability to deal with it as is expressly reserved 
to him in the trust instrument.'" 
(Emphasis in Davis, citations omitted) 
Although it is called a "Deed of Trust," clearly no "fiduciary trust" is created 
when property is subjected to a trust deed. Legal title is not vested in the "trustee." A 
"trustee" under a tmst deed does not have any equitable duty or right to hold and manage 
the property pledged as security under a trust deed. A "trustee" appointed under a deed 
of trust clearly does not have exclusive control of the property pledged: the trustor retains 
all ownership and management of the pledged property. And so on. 
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The inescapable legal conclusion is that a foreclosing "trustee" appointed by virtue 
of a deed of trust in Utah does not act in a "fiduciary capacity," even though similar terms 
such as "trust," "trustor," "trustee" and "beneficiary" are used. These are mere labels that 
do not establish any actual "fiduciary activity" or evidence any actions actually taken in a 
"fiduciary capacity." 
2. A foreclosing trustee in Texas also does not act in a "fiduciary 
capacity" 
FNMA attempts to invoke the non-judicial foreclosure laws of Texas on the theory 
that they regulate ReconTrust's "fiduciary activities" in Texas and therefore grant 
ReconTrust the statutory authority to perform the same "fiduciary activities" in Utah. 
But Texas foreclosure laws don't help FNMA, since they do not apply to any "fiduciary 
activities" of ReconTrust in Texas, as referred to in 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(e)(1). 
To the contrary, Texas' foreclosure statutes also explicitly state that a foreclosing 
trustee in Texas has no fiduciary duty. 
DUTIES OF TRUSTEE, (a) One or more persons may be authorized to exercise 
the power of sale under a security agreement, 
(b) A trustee may not be: 
(1) assigned a duty under the security instrument other than to exercise the power 
of sale in accordance with the terms of the security instrument; or 
(2) held to the obligations of a fiduciary of the mortgagor or mortgagee. 
If a foreclosing trustee in Texas is expressly prohibited by statute from having any 
fiduciary obligation, then non-judicial foreclosures activities by a foreclosing trustee in 
Texas are not a "fiduciary activity." Texas' non-judicial foreclosure statutes therefore do 
not "apply" to any "fiduciary activities" of ReconTrust in Texas, as described in 12 
C.F.R. § 9.7(e)(1), and are of no help to FNMA under its own theory. 
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3. Even the federal law relied upon by FNMA shows that serving as a 
foreclosing trustee does not constitute acting in a "fiduciary capacity" 
The Federal Regulation relied upon by FNMA also defeats its own argument. 
The description of how to determine where a national bank acts in a "fiduciary 
capacity" for purposes of Section 92(a) is set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 9.7, which confirms by 
its description of fiduciary activities that foreclosing on a property in not a "fiduciary" 
activity covered under § 9.7. Subsection (d) provides: 
A National bank acts in a fiduciary capacity in the state in which it [1] accepts the 
fiduciary appointment, [2] executes the documents that create the fiduciary 
relationship, and [3] makes the discretionary decisions regarding the 
investment or distribution of fiduciary assets. 
Under Utah's foreclosing statutes there is no "fiduciary appointment" of a 
foreclosing trustee by the trustor/debtor. There is no document "creating" a "fiduciary 
relationship" that a foreclosing trustee executes. And most importantly, a foreclosing 
trustee is not granted any discretionary authority to make decisions regarding the 
"investment or distribution" of the "fiduciary assets." (The same goes for Texas). 
FNMA is chasing a ghost. 
Since ReconTrust clearly does not act in a "fiduciary capacity" as described in 
Section 9.7, (or the laws of Utah or Texas), the entire preemption argument which is 
inextricably premised on ReconTrust acting in a "fiduciary capacity" when it forecloses, 
necessarily fails. 
C. Congress did not intend that the National Banking Act preempt Utah's local 
foreclosure laws 
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While the fact that a foreclosing trustee does not act in a "fiduciary capacity" 
should end the entire preemption discussion, Appellant will nevertheless briefly 
address the remainder of FNMA's argument to show how even under FNMA's own 
theory its arguments fail. 
1. The most recent federal court ruling explicitly rejects the same 
arguments presented here 
In Bell v. Countrywide Bank, et al., No. 2:11-CV-00271-BSJ (Mar. 15, 2012) 
(Addendum II, Doc. 8), Judge Jenkins soundly rejected the same preemption 
arguments that FNMA is making here, and expressly held that ReconTrust is not 
authorized to exercise a statutory power of sale within the State of Utah. 
FNMA's attempts to discredit Judge Jenkins' analysis fall short. Whether it 
was an impermissible advisory opinion does not rebut the substance of the arguments 
contained in Bell now that they have been raised in this case where there is no claim 
the issue is moot. Similarly, even if the issues were not raised by the parties in Bell, 
they have now been raised here, and FNMA still has no substantive rebuttal on the 
merits. Its only argument is that Judge Jenkins impermissibly utilized legislative 
history from one statute in interpreting another, but, it provides no law that says that 
Judge Jenkins could not use the legislative history connected to a particular phrase in 
another very similar statute, with similar purposes, here as well, especially when the 
interpretation is essentially a plain language interpretation anyways. 
Finally, there is no reason for this Court to abstain while Bell is taken up on 
appeal to the Tenth Circuit. The proper preemption analysis of FNMA's arguments 
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requires a preliminary determination of Utah law as to whether ReconTrust was acting 
in a "fiduciary capacity" or not when it purportedly foreclosed on Ms. Sundquist's 
home. Consequently, any risk of inconsistent rulings should be resolved by deference 
o 
to this Court's interpretation of Utah law. 
2. The National Banking Act Does Not Relieve ReconTrust From 
Complying With Utah Law When Serving As A Foreclosing Trustee 
Under A Utah Deed of Trust 
FNMA summarily challenges Judge Jenkins' analysis in Bell as to legislative 
history. But his analysis is strong. 
As Judge Jenkins noted in Bell, in passing the National Bank Act, Congress 
granted an "explicit power with an explicit statement that the exercise of that power is 
subject to State law." Barnett v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 34 (1996). The U.S. Supreme 
Court has already specifically identified § 92a of the National Bank Act as a section 
granting national banks authority to exercise specific powers so long as the powers are 
not contrary to State law. Id. at 34. 
"Congress has enacted no legislation immunizing national bank subsidiaries from 
compliance with nondiscriminatory state laws regulating the business activities of 
mortgage brokers and lenders. Nor has it authorized an executive agency to preempt such 
state laws whenever it concludes that they interfere with national bank activities." 
Walters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007), see dissent of Justice Stevens at 
1573. 
After all, if ReconTrust is asserting on appeal in Bell that the ruling was advisory, etc., then it is 
unlikely that the Tenth Circuit would actually reach the merits which are in fact properly 
presented to this Court. 
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FNMA presents two arguments in rebuttal. Nor does it challenge the United 
States Supreme Court's articulation that national banks: 
"... are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily 
course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation. All 
their contracts are governed and construed by State laws. Their acquisition 
and transfer of property, their right to collect their debts, and their liability to 
be sued for debts, are all based on State law. It is only when the State law 
incapacitates the banks from discharging their duties to the government 
that it becomes unconstitutional." National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 
353, 362, 19 L.Ed. 701 (1870) (emphasis added). 
Utah's non-judicial foreclosure statutes clearly do not "incapacitate" ReconTrust 
from discharging its duties to the government as a national bank, and therefore may not 
be preempted on a pretense. ReconTrust simply has not been granted any authority to act 
in contravention of Utah's non-judicial foreclosure laws. 
IV. Ms. Sundquist is entitled to her attorney fees if she prevails on this appeal 
If this Court holds that ReconTrust cannot do foreclosure sales in Utah, then 
FNMA lacks standing to bring the entire lawsuit and this Court would have to direct, the 
trial court on remand to dismiss the unlawful detainer action. Consequently, Ms. 
Sundquist would be the prevailing party entitled to her attorney fees under UCA 78B-6-
811. FNMA does not contradict this conclusion in its opposing briefs. 
Rather, it only challenges her claim to attorney fees under the private attorney 
general doctrine.9 FNMA summarily argues that there has not been a showing that this 
case rises to the level of a private attorney general case that would justify the awarding of 
attorney fees. But inasmuch as this ease has the potential of affecting thousands of 
9
 FNMA does briefly assert that attorney fees cannot be awarded on appeal but it did not provide any legal fees and 
ignores the fact that Ms. Sundquist lost below and therefore obviously would not have requested attorney fees 
below. 
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homeowners who have been unlawfully foreclosed and evicted from their homes, there is 
a obviously significant public issue, as evidenced by the fact the Attorney General has in 
fact sought to file an amicus curie in this case. 
FNMA's other argument is that the legislature has barred the Court from awarding 
private attorney general fees. Such a legislative bar, however, usurps the Court's 
constitutional authority to oversee the practice of law before it and to determine when 
fees may be awarded under its inherent authority. See generally Article VIII, Section 1, 
("The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court.") And therefore any 
statutory limitation is an unconstitutional intrusion into the Court's domain. 
Consequently, under either theory Ms. Sundquist is entitled to her attorney fees 
and expenses incurred as part of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
It is undisputed the ReconTrust does not qualify as a foreclosing trustee under 
Utah's foreclosing statutes, and therefore has not been granted any statutory authority to 
exercise the statutory power of sale provided in U.C.A §57-1-23. 
FNMA's argument that Utah's foreclosure statutes in general are preempted by 
federal law regarding national banks' "fiduciary" activities fails in that foreclosing 
trustees in Utah are not acting in a "fiduciary capacity," nor do they act in a "fiduciary 
capacity" in Texas. The purported permission to do the same "fiduciary activities" in 
Utah as Texas therefore does not grant ReconTrust any right to conduct non-judicial sales 
in Utah. 
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Consequently, ReconTrust's purported Trustee's Deed is null and void ab initio, 
and FNMA could not take any interest in the property thereby. 
Since FNMA lacks any title interest in the property, it lacks standing to even bring 
this lawsuit, and correspondingly lacked standing to seek the Order of Restitution. 
Correspondingly, the trial court also lacked jurisdiction to grant it. 
The Order of Restitution should therefore be stricken as void, it being beyond the 
trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, and the matter remanded with instructions for the 
trial court to award Ms. Sundquist her attorney fees as the prevailing party and to dismiss 
immediately FNMA's unlawful detainer case. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of July, 2012. 
Certification of Compliance with Rule 27(f)(1) the foregoing reply brief contains 
no more than 7,000 words in that according to the word count of the word processing 
system it contains 6,230 words. 
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